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1 .O INTRODUCTION 
Most of t h e  rnan?ed s p a c e f l i g h t  programs planned by NASA f o r  t h e  l a t e  
1970’s and 1980’s are concen t r a t ed  on e a r t h  o r b i t a l  ope ra t ions .  
u s e  t h e  s h u t t l e  and a v a r i e t y  of manned and unmanned payloads d e l i v e r e d  t o  
o r b i t  by t h e  s h u t t l e .  
These w i l l  
T h i s  12- month s t u d y  examined f i v e  s p e c i f i c  s a f e t y  i s s u e s  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  
t h e s e  o p e r a t i o n s .  The f i v e  i s s u e s  
were s t u d i e d  as f i v e  s e p a r a t e  t a s k s  i n  t h e  o r d e r  shown. .Hazards a n a l y s e s  w e r e  
used on t h e  f i r s t  t h r e e  t a s k s  only.  
The s tudy  l o g i c  used i s  shown i n  F igu re  1. 
This  Con t rac t  Summary Report p r e s e n t s  t h e  s i g n i f i c a n t  r e s u l t s  f o r  each  of 
t h e  f i v e  s a f e t y  i s s u e s  i n  Sec t ion  2.0. Supporting r e s e a r c h  and technology 
requirements  are summarized i n  Sec t ion  3 . 0 ,  and sugges t ions  f o r  f u r t h e r  e f f o r t  
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1.1 SCOPE 
The s tudy  scope covered t h e  v e h i c l e s  shown i n  F igu re  2. 
SHUTTLE ORBITER SlWI"I7J PAYLOADS SPACE STATION 
SORTIE MODULES 
UPPER STAGE VEHICLES 
I N I T I A L  (6 -MAN)  
GROWTH (12 -MAN)  
INTEGRAL TANK 
* D R O P  TANK SATELLITES 
Figure  2.  Vehicles  Considered i n  Study 
I n i t i a l  t a s k s  were based on t h e  i n t e g r a l  t ank  s h u t t l e  o r b i t e r ,  b u t  emphasis 
w a s  la ter  swttched t o  t h e  drop tank o r b i t e r  as t h i s  concept developed. The 
assumptions made were broad enough t h a t  no r e s u l t s  w e r e  i n v a l i d a t e d  by t h i s  
change. 
S h u t t l e  payloads considered included manned and unmanned s o r t i e  payloads 
( i . e . ,  a t t a c h e d  t o  t h e  o r b i t e r ) ,  sa te l l i t es  d e l i v e r e d  t o  e a r t h  o r b i t ,  and 
p o t e n t i a l  upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e s ,  such as t h e  Tug, Agena, Centaur ,  e tc . ,  used t o  
d e l i v e r  unmanned payloads t o  o r b i t s  beyond t h e  o r b i t e r ' s  c a p a b i l i t i e s .  
, 
The space s t a t i o n s  considered were modular s t a t i o n s  d e l i v e r e d  t o  e a r t h  
I n i t i a l  6-man v e r s i o n s  and growth v e r s i o n s  o r b i t  and assembled by t h e  o r b i t e r .  
w i t h  up t o  1 2  men, as de f ined  i n  r e c e n t  Phase B s t u d i e s ,  were s t u d i e d .  
Within t h e  scope of t h e  v e h i c l e s  d e s c r i b e d ,  t h e  s t u d y  i s  bounded by t h e  
fo l lowing  ground r u l e s :  
e The main concern i s  pe r sonne l  s a f e t y .  A lesser emphasis 
was p laced  on avoiding damage t o  o r  l o s s  of t h e  v e h i c l e s .  
0 The a n a l y s i s  w a s  confined t o  t h e  manned on-orbi t  phase.of  
missions.  
e The s tudy  r e s u l t s  cover on ly  t h e  f i v e  s p e c i f i c  concerns of 
t h e  s tudy.  
a s p e c t s  of t h e  r e l e v a n t  v e h i c l e s .  
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1 .2  STUDY OBJECTIVES 
The s tudy w a s  concerned w i t h  f i v e  s p e c i f i c  i s s u e s .  These i s s u e s  and 






Hazardous payloads.  
a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  c e r t a i n  o r b i t e r  payloads and t o  determine 
s a f e t y  r equ i r emen t s  and g u i d e l i n e s .  
Docking. The o b j e c t i v e  was t o  compare a number of d i f f e r e n t  
approaches f o r  docking an  o r b i t e r  t o  a space s t a t i o n ,  and t o  
recommend t h e  methods p r e f e r r e d  from a s a f e t y  p o i n t  of view. 
The o b j e c t i v e  w a s  t o  i d e n t i f y  haza rds  
On-board s u r v i v a b i l i t y .  The o b j e c t i v e  w a s  t o  determine t h e  
c o n f i g u r a t i o n a l  and o t h e r  requirements  f o r  t h e  o r b i t e r ,  
s o r t i e  module, and space s t a t i o n  t o  a l low pe r sonne l  t o  sur-  
vive on-board emergencies. 
Tumbling s p a c e c r a f t .  The purpose w a s  t o  determine p r a c t i c a l  
means f o r  a r r e s t i n g  t h e  motion of out-of-control  tumbling 
s p a c e c r a f t  by e x t e r n a l  means, o r  t o  a l l o w  on-board pe r sonne l  t o  
escape from 2 s p a c e c r a f t  i f  tumbling cannot be a r r e s t e d .  
Escape and r e scue .  The o b j e c t i v e  w a s  t o  determine t h e  
a p p l i c a b i l i t y  of p rev ious  o r  new concepts  f o r  escape,  
r e s c u e ,  and ba i l -ou t  t y p e  s u r v i v a b i l i t y  t o  t h e  o r b i t e r ,  
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1.3 RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER STUDIES 
The Safety in Earth Orbit study was performed in the context of a wide 
range of related studies. This relationship is shown in Figure 3 .  
RAM (GD) (NR SUB ON MSM) 
Figure 3.  Relationship to Other Studies 
The most important of these studies are the Phase B studies on the space 
station, shuttle, and RAM (Research and Application Modules). Phase A studies 
on the tug, orbit-to-orbit shuttle (OOS), and the chemical interorbital shuttle, 
and systems studies on the Orbital Operations and the In-Space Propellant 
Logistics Study (ISPLS) provided additional information on relevant hardware 
elements and also on operational modes. 
A good interchange of information was possible with all the concurrent 
studies for which NR was a prime contractor (subcontractor on the RAM). 
interchange of information and ideas generally flowed in both directions. 
interchange was particularly fruitful with the Orbital Operations study and 
the safety portion (Project 11) of the ISPLS study. 
Additional safety background was obtained from earlier safety studies by 
The 
This 
Boeing (on the space station), Lockheed (on the shuttle), and from ongoing 
studies by the Aerospace Corporation (on the shuttle and on escape and rescue). 
A particularly useful cooperative effort was also established with Pennsylvania 
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2.0 SIGNIFICANT RESULTS 
The five issues of the study were analyzed as five separate but related 
tasks during the study. The scope of each of these five tasks and the more 
significant results and conclusions are presented for each task in Sections 
2.1 to 2.5. 
Since the scope and the objective of each task was substantially differ- 
ent, a variety of approaches and outputs was involved. These are summarized 
in Table 1. 






Escape and rescue 
Appro a c h 
o Hazards identification 
Q Hazards analyses 
e Hazards identification 
e Hazards analyses 
(B Systems tradeoffs 
Systems analyses 
Hazards analyses 
o Dynamics analysis 
Systems analyses 
o Systems analyses 
Main Outputs 
o Safety requirements 
and guidelines 
e Safety requirements 
and guidelines 
e Docking system 
recommendations 
Q Configurational and 
other requirements 
o Safety requirements 
and guidelines 
o Safety device concep- 
tual designs 
e Escape and rescue 
system recommenda- 
t ions 
Fifty-nine hazards analyses were performed in the first three tasks, 
and approximately 450 safety requirements and guidelines were developed. 
(Requirements are mandatory; guidelines are discretionary. ) 
documented in specification format in two requirements and guidelines docu- 
ments, one for the shuttle orbiter and one for the shuttle payloads. 
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2 .1  HAZARDOUS PAYLOADS 
Many d i f f e r e n t  k inds  of  cargo  w i l l  b e  c a r r i e d  i n t o  o r b i t  i n  the cargo  
bay of t he  s h u t t l e  o r b i t e r .  I n  t h i s  t a sk ,  t h r e e  areas of s a f e t y  concern were 
analyzed.  These are: 
o Del ivery ,  deployment, and r e t r i e v a l  of upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e s  
such as t h e  Agena, Centaur,  Trans tage ,  Burner 11, Apollo 
s e r v i c e  module, and Tug 
o Transpor t  of 'hazardous f l u i d  v e s s e l s  
0 Cargo hand l ing  and t r a n s f e r  
The t a s k  cons i s t ed  of i d e n t i f y i n g  p o t e n t i a l  hazards  and performing 
hazards  ana lyses .  The p r i n c i p a l  conclus ions  and recommendations reached are: 
The o r b i t e r  des ign  is  extremely s e n s i t i v e  t o  even s m a l l  explos ions  
i n  the cargo  bay. Uncontained explos ions  equ iva len t  t o  as l i t t l e  
as 5 g (0.01 l b )  of TNT may r e s u l t  i n  exceeding t h e  s t r u c t u r a l  
des ign  l i m i t  of  t h e  cargo bay s t r u c t u r e  ( 1 4  kN/m2, 2 p s i )  from 
b l a s t  ove rp res su re .  By comparison, a hand grenade is e q u i v a l e n t  
t o  10 g (0.025 l b )  of TNT, and a f u l l y  loaded Centaur t o  approx- 
imate ly  2700 kg (6000 l b )  of TNT. 
Any s t r u c t u r a l  f a i l u r e  of a loaded upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e  w h i l e  i n  
t h e  o r b i t e r  cargo bay which r e s u l t s  i n  l a r g e  leaks of both f u e l  
and o x i d i z e r  w i l l  a lmost  c e r t a i n l y  b e  c a t a s t r o p h i c  t o  the o r b i t e r .  
The energy conten t  of even t h e  smallest l i q u i d  p r o p e l l a n t  upper 
s t a g e  v e h i c l e ,  i f  r e l e a s e d  suddenly,  i s  f a r  more than  can b e  t o l -  
e r a t e d  by t h e  o r b i t e r .  Every e f f o r t  m u s t  t h e r e f o r e  be made t o  
p reven t  s t r u c t u r a l  f a i l u r e  of upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e s  w h i l e  i n  o r  
near t h e  o r b i t e r .  Remedial measures are n o t  cons idered  p r a c t i c a l ,  
and have n o t  been recommended. 
The l i q u i d  con ten t s  of upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e s  be ing  r e tu rned  t o  e a r t h  
should b e  dumped t o  space b e f o r e  d e o r b i t i n g  t h e  o r b i t e r .  
accep tab le  l e v e l  of r e s i d u a l  l i q u i d s  and gas  b e f o r e  r e t u r n i n g  t o  
e a r t h  should  b e  such  t h a t  an i n s u l a t i o n  f a i l u r e ,  leakage,  o r  a 
crash landing  w i l l  no t  r e s u l t  i n  o v e r p r e s s u r i z a t i o n ,  f i r e ,  o r  a 
similar acc iden t .  
The 
I f  t h e  leakage of l a r g e  q u a n t i t i e s  of payload f l u i d s  i n t o  t h e  
o r b i t e r  cargo bay i s  considered c r e d i b l e ,  then a d d i t i o n a l  ven t ing  
of t h e  cargo  bay beyond t h a t  provided by t h e  o r b i t e r  f o r  normal 
vent ing  may b e  r equ i r ed  t o  avoid  p o t e n t i a l  o v e r p r e s s u r i z a t i o n  of 
t h e  cargo bay. Th i s  may need t o  b e  cons idered  and provided f o r  
i n d i v i d u a l l y  f o r  each payload which con ta ins  l a r g e  q u a n t i t i e s  of 
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e Capab i l i t y  should  b e  provided f o r  t h e  o rbF te r  t o  d e o r b i t ,  
r e e n t e r ,  and l and  wi th  a f u l l y  loaded upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e .  
It is n o t  recommended t h a t  reduced f a c t o r s  of s a f e t y  b e  
cons idered  f o r  t h i s  s i t u a t i o n ,  b u t  t h e  r e e n t r y  and landing  
load  cr i ter ia  should be less seve re  than t h e  normal des ign  
cases (e .g . ,  2 CJ cond i t ions  i n s t e a d  of 3 0 ) f o r  t h i s  m a x i -  
, mum weight  cond i t ion .  
e Upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e s  must b e  man-compatible; i .e.,  m a n  r a t i n g  
s a f e t y  c r i te r ia  must be  app l i ed  t o  s y s t e m s  and func t ions  of 
t h e  upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e  which could c r e a t e  a hazard  t o  t h e  
o r b i t e r  w h i l e  t h e  upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e  i s  i n  o r  n e a r  t h e  
o r b i t e r .  These cr i ter ia ,  w h i l e  n o t  c u r r e n t l y  def ined ,  must b e  
def ined  c o n s i s t e n t l y  f o r  t he  s h u t t l e  and f o r  upper s t a g e  
v e h i c l e s .  One p o s s i b i l i t y  is t h a t  a f l i g h t  test  of  t h e  upper 
s t a g e  v e h i c l e  be performed i n  t h e  s h u t t l e  us ing  f l u i d s  which 
are p h y s i c a l l y  similar t o  t h e  p r o p e l l a n t s  b u t  which do n o t  
react chemica l ly .  
because i t  can r e p l a c e  much o f  t h e  ground q u a l i f i c a t i o n  t e s t i n g .  
Such a f l i g h t  test  may be c o s t - e f f e c t i v e  
0 Launching space  s t a t i o n  o r  s o r t i e  modules p re s su r i zed  a t  
1 atmosphere can p r e s e n t  t h e  o r b i t e r  wi th  a cons ide rab le  haz- 
a rd .  A t y p i c a l  module has  a n  exp los ive  p o t e n t i a l  of 10 kg 
(22 l b )  TNT e q u i v a l e n t  i n  t h e  vacuum environment of space.  
t h i s  energy is r a p i d l y  r e l eased ,  e.  g . , by s t r u c t u r a l  f a i l u r e  
of t h e  module, t h e  r e s u l t i n g  b l a s t  and shrapnel would cause 
c a t a s t r o p h i c  darnige t o  t h e  c r b i t e r .  
I f  
0 Many d i f f e r e n t  f l u i d s ,  of vary ing  degrees  of hazards  and i n  
vary ing  q u a n t i t i e i s ,  are c u r r e n t l y  planned f o r  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  
t o  and from space  by t h e  o r b i t e r .  . An adequate  l e v e l  of s a f e t y  
appears  p o s s i b l e  t o  b o t h  t h e  personnel  involved and t h e  space-  
c r a f t .  
m u s t  await a more d e t a i l e d  d e f i n i t i o n  of t h e  s p a c e c r a f t ,  pay- 
loads ,  and t h e i r  planned ope ra t ions  than  is c u r r e n t l y  a v a i l a b l e .  
More s p e c i f i c  s a f e t y  f e a t u r e s  than  de f ined  i n  t h e  s tudy  
e Cargo hand l ing  i n  space  p r e s e n t s  some s p e c i f i c  hazards  a s soc i -  
a t e d  w i t h  t h e  zero-g environment and w i t h  t h e  l i m i t e d  remedial  
and escape  p rov i s ions  a v a i l a b l e .  I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  normal s a f e t y  
f e a t u r e s  r e q u i r e d  on the ground, s p e c i f i c  requirements  and 
gu ide l ines ,  such as t e t h e r i n g  of heavy cargo a t  a l l  times, 
double-containing hazardous cargo ,  and provid ing  mechanical 
assist where p r o p u l s i v e  f o r c e s  are p o s s i b l e ,  have been i d e n t i -  
f i e d .  
7 
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2 .2  DOCKING 
The Space S t a t i o n  Program Phase B s t u d i e s  i d e n t i f i  r n  as t d a con t h e  
b e s t  way t o  e f f e c t  docking between t h e  s h u t t l e  o r b i t e r  and l a r g e  v e h i c l e s  such 
as t h e  space s t a t i o n .  ~ I n  t h i s  t a s k  t h e  s a f e t y  a s p e c t s  of v a r i o u s  docking modes 
and systems were compared t o  determine t h e  p r e f e r r e d  approaches from a s a f e t y  
p o i n t  of view. 
The docking modes considered are i l l u s t r a t e d  i n  F igu re  4 .  These are t h e  
o r b i t e r - t o - s t a t i o n  mode, i n  which t h e  two l a r g e  v e h i c l e s  dock t o  each o t h e r ,  
and t h e  f r e e - f l y i n g  mode, i n  which t h e  module being t r a n s f e r r e d  f r e e - f l i e s  
between t h e  o r b i t e r  and space s t a t i o n  and i s  t h e  on ly  v e h i c l e  t h a t  docks t o  t h e  
o r b i t e r  o r  s t a t i o n .  
I 
\ -  e \ 
Figure  4. Docking Modes Considered 
FREE FLYING 
MODULE MODE 
The docking systems cons ide red  are i l l u s t r a t e d  i n  Figure 5, These are 
t h e  d i r e c t  docking system, as used on t h e  Apollo; manipulator  docking, as 
planned on t h e  o r b i t e r  and s t a t i o n ;  and an' ex t endab le  tunne l  docking system, 
as considered on t h e  Apollo a t  one t i m e ,  which provides  a s e p a r a t i o n  of 
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The docking modes and systems were analyzed and eva lua ted  u s i n g  t h e  
fol lowing cri teria:  
e P o t e n t i a l  f o r  pe r sonne l  l o s s  
e Risk ( p r o b a b i l i t y  and c r i t i c a l i t y )  of remaining haza rds  
e Design impact f o r  s a f e t y  requirements  
0 C a p a b i l i t y  t o  d e a l  w i t h  emergency docking 
Conclusions and recommendations on docking modes are: 
e The o r b i t e r - t o - s t a t i o n  docking mode h a s  more p o t e n t i a l  of causing 
major damage t o  t h e  o r b i t e r  and/or  s t a t i o n  than t h e  f r e e - f l y i n g  
docking mode, b u t  does n o t  d i r e c t l y  lead t o  pe r sonne l  l o s s .  The 
f r e e - f l y i n g  docking mode has a p o t e n t i a l  f o r  pe r sonne l  l o s s  when 
used t o  t r a n s f e r  personnel  between o r b i t e r  and s t a t i o n ,  b u t  pre- 
c ludes t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of a s i n g l e  acc iden t  r e s u l t i n g  i n  loss o f  
b o t h  the o r b i t e r  and s t a t i o n .  
e The o r b i t e r - t o - s t a t i o n  docking mode should be considered a c c e p t a b l e  
from t h e  s a f e t y  p o i n t  of view wLth any of t h e  a c c e p t a b l e  docking systems. 
0 The use  of the f r e e - f l y i n g  docking mode f o r  t h e  t r a n s f e r  of manned 
modules shou ld  b e  r e j e c t e d  f o r  normal o p e r a t i o n s  because of t h e  
p o t e n t i a l  f o r  pe r sonne l  l o s s .  This mode may b e  used i n  emergencies.  
con ta ined  p ropu l s ion ,  c o n t r o l ,  and docking c a p a b i l i t i e s  (such as the  
s p a c e  tug) are developed f o r  o t h e r  purposes and are a v a i l a b l e ,  t h e i r  
use i n  t r a n s f e r r i n g  modules o r  payloads between o r b i t e r  and s t a t i o n  
shou ld  b e  cons ide red  as an accep tab le  mode. Use of t h i s  f r e e - f l y i n g  
mode f o r  unmanned payloads,  i n  con junc t ion  w i t h  t h e  u s e  of t h e  o r b i t e r -  
t o - s t a t i o n  mode f o r  a l l  manned modules, has  s i g n i f i c a n t  s a f e t y  advan- 
t a g e s .  
o I f  mini-tugs (such as remote maneuvering u n i t s )  o r  modules w i t h  s e l f -  
Conclusions and recommendations on docking systems are: 
e The d i r e c t  docking, ex tendab le  tunne l ,  and manipulator  docking systems 
can b e  made adequa te ly  s a f e ,  and should a l l  b e ’ c o n s i d e r e d  as a c c e p t a b l e  
docking systems from t h e  s a f e t y  p o i n t  of view. 
o The d i r e c t  docking system h a s  t h e  g r e a t e s t  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  i n a d v e r t e n t  
c o l l i s i o n  because  o f  t h e  c l o s e  proximity of t h e  docking v e h i c l e s ,  The 
manipulator  docking system has  t h e  minimum p o t e n t i a l  f o r  i n a d v e r t e n t  
c o l l i s i o n  between v e h i c l e s  because of t h e  r e l a t i v e l y  l a r g e  s e p a r a t i o n  
d i s t a n c e  a t  i n i t i a l  cap tu re ,  b u t  h a s  more f a i l u r e  modes which can 
r e s u l t  i n  i n a d v e r t e n t  c o n t a c t  and damage. 
q u i c k e r  than t h e  o t h e r  systems. 
more p o t e n t i a l  f o r  docking w i t h  an out-of-control  tumbling o r  s p i n n i n g  
s p a c e c r a f t .  
U s e  of t h e  man ipu la to r  f o r  t r a n s f e r r i n g  modules w i t h  men i n  them s h o u l d  
b e  r e j e c t e d  as a p r a c t i c a l  o p t i o n  f o r  p e r s o n n e l  t r a n s f e r  i n  normal oper- 
a t i o n s  because of t h e  h igh  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  pe r sonne l  l o s s .  The method i s  
a c c e p t a b l e  f o r  t r a n s f e r  of unmanned modules o r  f o r  emergencies.  
0 .  The direct docking can perform a time-critical emergency docking 
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2.3 ON-BOARD SURVIVABILITY 
Many emergencies are possible in manned spacecraft for which the survival 
of the personnel must be ensured on-board the spacecraft until a normal 
situation can be restored or the personnel can be rescued. 
this task was to analyze the personnel traffic patterns, escape routes, and 
compartment isolation from a safety standpoint for the orbiter, sortie modules, 
and the modular space station, and to determine the configurational and other 
requirements to ensure on-board survivability. 
The purpose of 
Seven candidate configurations of the orbiter were considered, consisting 
of various combinations of crew compartment, passenger compartment, and airlock. 
These are shown schematically in Figure 6. 
the Phase B studies, consisting of a single combined crew/passenger compartment 
and an airlock, is represented by Configuration 2. If the airlock is made 
large enough to accommodate all on-board personnel, however, it may be con- 
sidered to be like Configuration 3 .  
The configuration resulting from 
. , "  , '  , 
P = PASSEhGER COCiPARTkiENT 
f = AIRLOCK 
Figure 6. Candidate Orbiter Configurations 
Many operational options are available for coping with emergencies such 
as fire, toxicity, explosions, and depressurization. The various options 
require different combinations of compartmentation, airlock capability, and 
pressure suits. The options available in case 'of l o s s  of pressure on-board 
the orbiter with an unmanned payload are shown in Figure 7. This figure 
'ABORT EQUIPMENT OPERATES IN DEPRESSURIZED ENVlRONMENl 
Figure 7. Options for On-Board Survivial following Depressurization 
On Orbiter with Unmanned Payload 
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a l s o  shows some of t h e  requirements  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  e a c h  op t ion ,  and t h e  s u i t -  
a b i l i t y  of each o p t i o n  t o  t h e  seven c a n d i d a t e  o r b i t e r  c o n f i g u r a t i o n s .  The 
t e r m  " 8  p s i  suits" r e f e r s  t o  p r e s s u r e  s u i t s  which can b e  donned by pe r sonne l  
acc l ima ted  t o  a one atmosphere environment and b e  exposed t o  low p r e s s u r e  
w i t h i n  a few minutes (approximately 5 min.) of t h e  occurrence of an emergency. 
S u i t s  of 3.5 p s i  r e q u i r e  a few hour s  p r e b r e a t h i n g  of p u r e  oxygen, a t  one 
atmosphere p r e s s u r e ,  t o  avo id  decompression s i c k n e s s  ( t h e  bends) . A l l  o p t i o n s  
r e q u i r e  t h e  equ ipmen t+requ i red  f o r  a b o r t  t o  o p e r a t e  and b e  ope rab le  i n  a 
d e p r e s s u r i z e d  environment. 
When all t h e  c o n f i g u r a t i o n s  are analyzed a g a i n s t  a l l  t h e  i d e n t i f i e d  
emergencies, an  i n t e g r a t e d  set of o p t i o n s  can b e  developed. These o p t i o n s  are 
shown i n  F igu re  8 f o r  t h e  seven c o n f i g u r a t i o n s .  
are i d e n t i f i e d  by t h e  let ters A t o  E,  and d i f f e r  b a s i c a l l y  i n  t h e  q u a n t i t y  and 
t y p e  of p r e s s u r e  s u i t s  r e q u i r e d ,  and whether o r  n o t  a s e p a r a t e  r e fuge  compart- 
ment i s  a v a i l a b l e .  
The f i v e  d i f f e r e n t  op t ions  
Also shown i n  t h i s  f i g u r e  are t h e  s a f e t y  e v a l u a t i o n s  f o r  t h e  va r ious  op t ions .  
A l l  o p t i o n s  shown can d e a l  w i t h  t h e  emergencies considered,  b u t  Configurat ions 1 
and 2, which only have one compartment, do n o t  p rov ide  a r e fuge  compartment i n  
case of a n  emergency which r ende r s  t h e  compartment u n i n h a b i t a b l e  e i t h e r  s h i r t -  
s l e e v e  o r  s u i t e d .  These two c o n f i g u r a t i o n s  are, t h e r e f o r e ,  r a t e d  accep tab le ,  
provided 8 p s i  s u i t s  are c a r r i e d  on-board f o r  a l l  personnel .  
between t h e  "good" and "best"  op t ions  is t h a t  t h e  l a t t e r  allow f o r  a 2-minute 
r e a c t i o n  t i m e  ( i .e. ,  assess s i t u a t i o n  and e x i t  t o  a n o t h e r  compartment) i n s t e a d  
of a 7-minute r e a c t i o n  t i m e  (assess s i t u a t i o n  and don 8 p s i  s u i t s ) .  
The d i f f e r e n c e  
1 (XLSSURE SUITS I >Aft17 CACIOP.5 SAFETY 
CONFIGURATION OPTION r QlY.  1 T Y R  ' PEACTION TIME. 1 REFUGE COMPT RATING 
ACCEPTABU 
2.- A IALL 1 B RI 7MINS N O  I ACCEPTABE 
3.i'cJ- B 2 [ E R l  7.MINS , MS I GOOD 
I I No I.=[ i A I ALL 1 a SI 7 ~ 1 ~ s  
I 
i c ALL 13.5 RI z MINS I YES ' BEST 
4 .EJi---J D 2 3.5 PSI ZMINS YES, IF ACCE<Sl8LE POOR** 
B 2 E R I  7MINS YES i GOOD 
C ALL 3.5 Ri YES E S T  2MlNS 
D 2 YES DESI , 3.5KI Z M I M  
0 2 BRI 7 MlNS MS GOOD 
5 .-
6.- C ALL 3.5 RI 2 MlNS MS E S T  
E 2 3.5 RI MS E S T  2MINS 
(EVA1 
7 .m D 2 3.5 RI 2MlNS YES BEST 
+REACTION TlMf TO ACHIEVE SAFETY 
"AIRLOCK PROBLEM CAN PREVENT ACCESS TO CREW COMPARTMEN? 
7 MlNS TO D O N  SUITS; 2 MINI TO EGRESS IO REFUGE COMPT 
Figure  8. Cornparisan and Eva lua t ion  of Options 
Conclusions and recommendations reached on t h e  f i n a l  Phase B o r b i t e r  
Quick-donning p r e s s u r e  s u i t s  which do n o t  r e q u i r e  p reb rea th ing  
(8 p s i  suits) shou ld  b e  provided f o r  a l l  on-board personnel .  
The crew/passenger compartment should b e  d iv ided  i n t o  two s e c t i o n s  
by a p a r t i t i o n  which can exclude smoke and fumes, and can p rov ide  
p r o t e c t i o n  a g a i n s t  e x c e s s i v e  h e a t  from a f i r e .  These s e c t i o n s  can 
p r o v i d e  temporary r e f u g e  u n t i l  c o r r e c t i v e  measures can b e  taken. 
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A l l  equipment r e q u i r e d  f o r  r e t u r n  t o  e a r t h  should b e  capable  of 
o p e r a t i n g  i n  a depres su r i zed  environment, and of be ing  ope ra t ed  
by t h e  crew i n  p r e s s u r e  s u i t s .  
C a p a b i l i t y  should b e  provided f o r  r e t u r n i n g  from EVA d i r e c t l y  
i n t o  t h e  crew/passenger compartment. 
Provided t h e  above recommendations are implemented, t h e  a i r l o c k  
is n o t  r e q u i r e d  f o r  s a f e t y  purposes.  
p o s s i b l y  as a payload i t e m ,  on mis s ions  f o r  which EVA is planned. 
It shou ld  be a v a i l a b l e ,  
I f  t h e  a i r l o c k  is  capable  o f  accommodating a l l  passengers  i n  
emergency s h i r t s l e e v e  cond i t ions  through d e o r b i t  and e n t r y ,  then 
8 p s i  suits are r e q u i r e d  only f o r  t h e  o r b i t e r  crew on t h o s e  
mis s ions .  The passengers  have t i m e  t o  r e t u r n  t o  t h e i r  seats f o r  
l a n d i n g  a f t e r  r each ing  low a l t i t u d e s .  
S i m i l a r  a n a l y s e s  c a r r i e d  o u t  on manned s o r t i e  modules a t t a c h e d  t o  t h e  
o r b i t e r  l e d  t o  t h e  fol lowing conc lus ions  and recommendations: 
e A s o r t i e  module c o n s i s t i n g  of two s e p a r a t e  p r e s s u r i z e d  modules 
does  no t  have any s i g n i f i c a n t  s a f e t y  advantages compared t o  a 
s i n g l e  module ve r s ion .  I n  b o t h  cases, t h e  o r b i t e r  i s  a v a i l a b l e  
as a s e p a r a t e  r e fuge  compartment. 
No s a f e t y  requirement  e x i s t s  f o r  an a i r l o c k  between the s o r t i e  
module and t h e  o r b i t e r .  
o 
0 A m e a n s  o f  emergency e x i t  (dua l  eg res s  c a p a b i l i t y )  should b e  pro- 
v ided  i n  s o r t i e  modules; f o r  example, by a l o n g i t u d i n a l  f l o o r  
p rov id ing  independent pe r sonne l  r o u t e s  above and below t h e  f l o o r .  
0 Emergency accommodations should b e  provided i n  t h e  o r b i t e r  f o r  a l l  
pas senge r s  du r ing  an  a b o r t .  
Ana lys i s  of t h e  s p a c e  s t a t i o n  during assembly, normal o p e r a t i o n s ,  and 
resupply by an  o r b i t e r  showed t h a t  t h e  fo l lowing  cr i ter ia  shou ld  b e  app l i ed :  
& 0 Access t o  two o r  more s h i r t s l e e v e  e n t r a n c e s  i n t o  normally h a b i t a b l e  
compartments of more than  25 m 3  (880 f t 3 )  i n  volume should b e  immed- 
i a t e l y  a v a i l a b l e  from each of t h e  o t h e r  normally i n h a b i t e d  compartments. 
0 C a p a b i l i t y  s h o u l d  b e  provided f o r  t h e  emergency s h i r t s l e e v e  s u r v i v a l  
of a l l  on-board pe r sonne l  u n t i l  t h e  n e x t  resupply o r  emergency s h u t t l e  
f l i g h t  fo l lowing  t h e  loss of a c c e s s  t o  any one module/compartment and 
t h e  l o s s  of equipment and s u p p l i e s  i n  t h a t  module/compartment. I f  
t h e  l o s s  of t h e  module/compartment d i v i d e s  t h e  s t a t i o n  i n t o  two o r  
more i s o l a t e d  h a b i t a b l e  s e c t i o n s ,  t hen  each  s e c t i o n  shou ld  p rov ide  
t h e  s u r v i v a l  c a p a b i l i t y  f o r  a l l  on-board pe r sonne l ,  i nc lud ing  an 








o r  f l u i d s  
2.4 TUMBLING SPACECRAFT 
8.9 
0.4 t o  4.0 
Uncontrol led tumbling o f  a s p a c e c r a f t  fol lowing l o s s  of i ts  c a p a b i l i t y  t o  
c o n t r o l  a t t i t u d e  is  one of t h e  most c r i t i c a l  emergency s i t u a t i o n s  t h a t  cou ld  
a r i se  i n  space. Deorbi t ,  r e e n t r y ,  o r  docking would n o t  b e  p o s s i b l e  under t h e s e  
c o n d i t i o n s .  Such a s i t u a t i o n  could b e  c a t a s t r o p h i c ,  and r e s u l t  i n  l o s s  of b o t h  
t h e  v e h i c l e  and i ts  occupants .  
Malfunctioning 
t h r u s t e r  
The purpose o f  t h i s  t a s k  w a s  t o  examine possible 'methods f o r  a r r e s t i n g  
t h e  motion of an out-of-control  tumbling s p a c e c r a f t  by means e x t e r n a l  t o  the  
v e h i c l e  i n  o r d e r  to s a v e  t h e  on-board pe r sonne l  and, i f  p o s s i b l e ,  t h e  space-  
c r a f t ;  and t o  determine t h e  f e a s i b i l i t y  and e s t a b l i s h  requirements f o r  person- 
n e l  e scape  i n  t h e  even t  t h e  tumbling cannot b e  a r r e s t e d .  Four types o f  space- 
c r a f t  were considered: t h e  i n t e g r a l  t ank  s h u t t l e  o r b i t e r ,  t h e  drop t a n k  s h u t t l e  
o r b i t e r ,  t h e  space s t a t i o n ,  and s m a l l  space  v e h i c l e s  such as i n d i v i d u a l  s o r t i e  
modules o r  s p a c e  s t a t i o n  modules. The r e scu ing  v e h i c l e  w a s  assumed t o  be a 
s h u t t l e  o r b i t e r  w i th  an a p p r o p r i a t e  emergency payload, A l l  t h e  concepts  con- 
s i d e r e d  f o r  a r r e s t i n g  t h e  tumbling could, however, b e  used equa l ly  w e l l  i n  a 
remotely c o n t r o l l e d  mode from an unmanned tug brought  up i n  a s h u t t l e  o r b i t e r ,  
0.03 
Worst c a s e  tumbling c o n d i t i o n s  were e s t i m a t e d  by Pennsylvania  S t a t e  Uni- 
v e r s i t y  under a NASA c o n t r a c t ,  based on a v a r i e t y  o f  p o s t u l a t e d  torque-producing 
s i t u a t i o n s .  The maximum a n g u l a r  tumbling rates e s t a b l i s h e d  are summarized i n  
Table 2.  Hardover gimbaled engines  and i n a d v e r t e n t  RCS f i r i n g  were l i m i t e d  t o  
t i m e s  of 15 seconds and 60 seconds,  r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  as b e i n g  maximum l i k e l y  crew 
r e a c t i o n  t i m e s .  The e s c a p i n g  atmosphere and escaping gases  o r  f l u i d s  cases 
are based on wors t  case cond i t ions  of leakage w i t h  t h e  maximum p o s s i b l e  moment 
a r m ,  C o l l i s i o n  v e l o c i t i e s  of up t o  1 .5  m/sec (5 f p s )  were assumed. 
Tab le  2 .  Summary of Maximum Tumbling Rates i n  RPM 
Modular Space 
Source S t a t i o n  
C o l l i s i o n s  0.6 t o  2 . 1  
Hardover 
gimb a1 
Does n o t  apply 
Small  Space 
Vehicle  
4.7 t o  14.7 
52 
Not c r i t i ca l  
Does n o t  apply 
0.5 t o  4.0 
I n t e g r a l  Tank 
O r b i t e r  
0.3 t o  1.1 
Not c r i t i ca l  
Not c r i t i ca l  
1 t o  2 
0.5 t o  4.0 
~ 
Drop Tank 
O r b i t e r  
0.5 t o  1 .4  
Not c r i t i ca l  
Not c r i t i ca l  
1 t o  2 
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Twenty-three d i f f e r e n t  concepts f o r  a r r e s t i n g  t h e  tumbling were considered.  
The most p r a c t i c a l  of t h e s e  w e r e  t h e  water j e t  concept  and t h e  s t i c k - o n  rocke t  
concept.  
The water j e t  concept ,  i l l u s t r a t e d  i n  F igu re  9-A, c o n s i s t s  of a water t ank  
of about 3 m (10 f t )  diameter  c a r r i e d  on board t h e  r e scue  o r b i t e r  as a r e scue  
k i t .  A v a r i a b l e  p r e s s u r e  pump, e l e c t r i c a l l y  dr iven,  produces a f i n e l y  atomized 
jet of water -through one of t h r e e  d i f f e r e n t  s i z e  n o z z l e s .  The o r b i t e r  i s  
pointed so  t h a t  t h e  water impinges on t h e  tumbling s p a c e c r a f t  . t o  c a n c e l  out  i ts  
angu la r  momentum. The water j e t  is d r iven  a t  30 t o  120 m / s e c  (100 t o  400 f p s ) ,  
and is sp read  out  s u f f i c i e n t l y  a t  impact t o  produce very low p r e s s u r e s  on t h e  
o r d e r  of 500 N/m2 (10 p s f )  on t h e  tumbling v e h i c l e .  The water impinges as ice  
p a r t i c l e s  which are f i n e l y  d iv ided  and, t h e r e f o r e ,  do n o t -  damage t h e  s u r f a c e s .  
N o  d e b r i s  i s  l e f t  i n  o r b i t .  The tumbling motion can b e  a r r e s t e d  f o r  t h e  worst  
ca se  considered w i t h  4 hours  of j e t  impingement. 
4 STICK4 )N ROCKETS 
Figure  9 .  Water Jet and S t i ck -On  Rocket Concepts 
The s t i c k - o n  rocke t  concept, i l l u s t r a t e d  i n  F igu re  9-B, c o n s i s t s  of a l a r g e  
number of s m a l l  s o l i d  r o c k e t  motors of about 10 kg (22 l b )  each.  These are 
d i r e c t e d  a t  low speed toward t h e  tumbling s p a c e c r a f t  by a "gun" on t h e  r e scu ing  
o r b i t e r .  Simple computer f u n c t i o n s  are requ i r ed  t o  determine t h e  c o r r e c t  t iming 
f o r  f i r i n g  the rocke t s  s o  as t o  h i t  t h e  d e s i r e d  p o r t i o n  of t h e  t m b l i n g  v e h i c l e .  
The spin-s  t a b i l i z e d  rocke t s  a t t a c h  themselves t o  t h e  tumbling v e h i c l e  by s e r r a t e d  
f r i c t i o n  pads, o r  by s p e c i a l  p e n e t r a t i o n  devices .  A t r i g g e r  i g n i t e s  t h e  rocke t s  
upon con tac t .  A s  many as t h i r t y  r o c k e t s  may b e  r e q u i r e d  t o  arrest t h e  wors t  case 
motion of t h e  l a r g e s t  v e h i c l e s .  
motion of t h e  v e h i c l e  w i l l  b e  adve r se ly  a f f e c t e d  by a small amount. Any rocke t s  
t h a t  do n o t  become a t t a c h e d  t o  t h e  tumbling v e h i c l e  are f i r e d  by a timer t o  pre- 
vent  them from becoming a haza rd  t o  o t h e r  s p a c e c r a f t .  
I f  a few r o c k e t s  are i n c o r r e c t l y  aimed, t h e  
For bo th  t h e s e  concepts a s i n g l e  r e scue  o r b i t e r  is  r e q u i r e d  t o  arrest t h e  
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I f  i t  is n o t  p o s s i b l e  t o  arrest t h e  tumbling motion, the on-board personnel  
must don suits, escape  from t h e  tumbling veh ic l e  by EVA, and be  rescued by t h e  
rescue  o r b i t e r .  Two problems were i n v e s t i g a t e d .  These were: (1) whether  
pe r sonne l  can e x i t  from t h e  tumbling v e h i c l e s  wi thout  r econ tac t  w i th  t h e  s t r u c -  
t u r e ,  and (2)  how t h e  personnel  can arrest t h e i r  own tumbling motion a f t e r  
e x i t i n g  so  t h a t  they can s a f e l y  b e  picked up by t h e  rescuing  o r b i t e r .  
,Analysis  shows t h a t ,  f o r  r o t a t i o n  of  t h e  veh ic l e s  about t h e i r  geometr ic  
axes, s u i t a b l e  ex i t s  and procedures  ex i s t  f o r  men t o  ex i t  from t h e  s p a c e c r a f t  
wi thout  r econ tac t .  For some cases a s m a l l  pushoff ,  w e l l  w i t h i n  man's physio- 
l o g i c a l  c a p a b i l i t i e s ,  may b e  r equ i r ed .  
geometr ic  axes s imul taneous ly ,  t h e  a n a l y s i s  becomes p r o h i b i t i v e l y  complex, b u t  
e x t r a p o l a t i o n  from t h e  s i n g l e  axis a n a l y s i s  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  s imple  procedures  
should b e  p r a c t i c a l .  
For g e n e r a l  tumbling about a l l  t h r e e  
Two s imple  schemes f o r  s lowing down t h e  men's tumbling motion t o  s m a l l  
enough va lues  f o r  r e scue  (about  3 rpm) are shown i n  F igure  10 .  I n  t h e  f i r s t  
one t h e  men jump out  i n  p a i r s ,  ho ld ing  a l i g h t  c a b l e  between them. 
of t h e  s p a c e c r a f t  they l e t  t h e  cab le  out .  When t h e  cab le  is extended t o  about  
3 m (10 f t ) ,  t h e i r  a n g u l a r  rates are reduced t o  less than 1 rpm. 
scheme t h e  men l e a v e  s i n g l y  and l e t  o u t  a c a b l e  w i t h  an a p p r o p r i a t e  m a s s  t i e d  
t o  i ts  f a r  end.  When the angular  ra te  i s  s u f f i c i e n t l y  s m a l l  t h e y  can release 
t h e  cable .  
When f r e e  
I n  t h e  second 
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2.5 ESCAPE AND RESCUE 
C r e w  s a f e t y  is  of prime importance i n  t h e  design of any manned system, 
add many p r o v i s i o n s  are i n c o r p o r a t e d  t o  p reven t  a c c i d e n t s  and t o  d e a l  w i t h  
emergencies. The u l t i m a t e  sa fegua rd ,  however, c o n s i s t s  of p rov i s ions  f o r  
escape o r  r e s c u e  from a s p a c e c r a f t  which can no longe r  s a f e l y  s u s t a i n  t h e  
on-board pe r sonne l .  
The purpose of t h i s  t a s k  was t o  examine the.  a p p l i c a b i l i t y  of va r ious  
e x i s t i n g  escape and r e scue  concepts  t o  s h u t t l e  and s p a c e  s t a t i o n  ope ra t ions ,  
and t o  recommend a d a p t a t i o n s  of t h e s e ,  o r  completely new concepts as necessa ry .  
Eleven e x i s t i n g  e scape  concepts (on-board l i f e - b o a t  v e h i c l e s  w i t h  
atmospheric  r e e n t r y  and l and ing  c a p a b i l i t y ) ,  two r e scue  concepts ( r e q u i r i n g  
launch of a r e s c u e  v e h i c l e  from t h e  ground and i t s  r e t u r n  t o  e a r t h ) ,  and f i v e  
s u r v i v a b i l i t y  concepts  ( l i f e - b o a t  v e h i c l e s  r e q u i r i n g  r e s c u e  ia o r b i t )  w e r e  
i d e n t i f i e d .  The e v a l u a t i o n  of t h e s e  concepts is  shown i n  Table 3 .  Costs and 
we igh t s  r e f e r  t o  a c a p a b i l i t y  f o r  s i x  o r  more men. M u l t i p l e  v e h i c l e s  are 
assumed where t h e i r  crew s i z e  i s  less than  s i x  men. 
Table  3. Eva lua t ion  of Escape, Rescue, and S u r v i v a b i l i t y  Concepts 
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S h i r t s l e e v e  use and a two o r  more man (buddy) c a p a b i l i t y  are cons idered  
p r i m e  s a f e t y  requirements .  Cost,  technology, and program r i s k  f a c t o r s  reduced 
t h e  p r e f e r r e d  cho ice  t o  t h e  fol lowing:  
SHUTTLE RESCUE 
Escape: 2- t o  6-man r e fu rb i shed  Apollo command module 










R e s  c Le : S h u t t l e  b o o s t e r  and o r b i t e r  




*NEW MODULE (MSV) 
*SURVIVABILITY C M  
S u r v i v a b i l i t y :  S o r t i e  module, space  s t a t i o n  module, modif ied 
Apollo command module, o r  new module, as found 
most c o s t - e f f e c t i v e  
The p r a c t i c a l  choices  between t h e s e  depend on whether  s h u t t l e  r e scue  w i l l  
be a v a i l a b l e ,  and i f  so,  whether  i t  w i l l  b e  quick  enough t o  respond t o  c r e d i b l e  
emergencies. The choices  and t h e  recommendations are  shown i n  F igure  11. These 
are summarized as follows: 
9 ESCAPE 
e The s h u t t l e  o r b i t e r  shou ld  b e  the primary v e h i c l e  f o r  d e a l i n g  w i t h  
emergencies of manned v e h i c l e s  i n  e a r t h  o r b i t .  A s h u t t l e  o r b i t e r  
shou ld  b e  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  r a p i d  emergency rescue  whenever manned 
earth o r b i t a l  f l i g h t  is i n  p rogres s .  This need n o t  b e  a ded ica t ed  
rescue  s h u t t l e  o r  o r b i t e r ,  bu t  a normal o p e r a t i o n a l  v e h i c l e  on 
which any of a v a r i e t y  of rescue  k i t s  could r e p l a c e  t h e  planned 
payload i n  an emergency. 
AVAILABLE OPTIONS a RECOMMENDATIONS 
Figure  11. Escape, Rescue, and S u r v i v a b i l i t y  Options 
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0 I f  t h e r e  is a t i m e  p e r i o d  a t  t h e  beginning of t h e  s h u t t l e  program 
( o r  du r ing  t h e  mature s h u t t l e  o p e r a t i o n a l  pe r iod )  when s h u t t l e  
r e scue  is n o t  p o s s i b l e  because of t h e  n o n a v a i l a b i l i t y  of  a r e scue  
s h u t t l e ,  launch pad, o r  o t h e r  reason,  ail Apollo command module (CM) 
shou ld  b e  c a r r i e d  i n  t h e  o r b i t e r  cargo bay as an escape v e h i c l e .  
This  can b e  a r e f u r b i s h e d  comand  module w i t h  up t o  s i x  seats (as 
e r e q u i r e d ) ,  and w i t h  c a p a b i l i t y  f o r  r e e n t r y  from e a r t h  o r b i t  and 
water landing.  The CM shou ld  be p r e s s u r i z e d  a t  8 p s i  t o  allow 
r a p i d  s h i r t s l e e v e  e n t r y  of t h e  pe r sonne l  w i t h o u t  t he  danger o f  
g e t t i n g  "bends." This escape CM is t h e  most c o s t - e f f e c t i v e  of  t h e  
e scape  and r e scue  v e h i c l e s  considered.  
o I f  a qu icke r  e scape  o r  r e scue  c a p a b i l i t y  is r e q u i r e d  than can b e  
provided f o r  by  t h e  emergency s h u t t l e  r e scue ,  escape o r  su rv iva -  
b i l i t y  modules should be c a r r i e d  on-board each f l i g h t .  These 
may b e  r e f u r b i s h e d  Apollo C M ' s ,  w i t h o u t  r e e n t r y  and l and ing  capa- 
b i l i t y ,  s o r t i e  o r  space s t a t i o n  modules, o r  new s u r v i v a b i l i t y  
modules. 
F igu re  12  shows how an e scape  Apollo CM s u r v i v a b i l i t y  module may b e  
c a r r i e d  i n  an o r b i t e r  w i th  a p a l l e t  s o r t i e  payload. 
I 
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3.0 SUPPORTING RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY REQUIREMENTS 
'The p r i n c i p a l  s u p p o r t i n g  r e s e a r c h  and technology requirements  i d e n t i f i e d  
are p resen ted  below i n  t h e  o r d e r  o f  t h e  f i v e  t a s k s  performed dur ing  t h e  s t u d y .  
e The behav io r  of l i q u i d s ,  p r e s s u r i z e d  g a s e s ,  and cryogenics  should 
b e  s t u d i e d  t o  understand chemical,  c o r r o s i o n ,  exp los ion ,  and 
f lammabil i ty  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  i n  zero-g and vacuum o r  low-pressure 
environments.  
e Means f o r  d e t e c t i n g  and s u p p r e s s i n g  f i r e s  i n  a zero-g p r e s s u r i z e d  
environment shou ld  b e  i n v e s t i g a t e d .  
e Simula t ion  s t u d i e s  of t h e  dynamics and crew c a p a b i l i t i e s  of t h e  
manipulator  docking system shou ld  b e  conducted a t  t h e  earliest  
p o s s i b l e  t i m e  i n  o r d e r  t o  understand t h e  dynamic c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of 
t h e  system and t o  i d e n t i f y  and r e s o l v e  haza rds  which are n o t  appa ren t  
from conceptual  s t u d i e s .  
p a r t  of such s i m u l a t i o n s .  
A s a f e t y  a n a l y s i s  should b e  an i n t e g r a l  
e P r e s s u r e  s u i t s  which can b e  qu ick ly  donned wi thou t  p r e b r e a t h i n g  
oxygen (8 p s i  s u i t s )  shou ld  b e  developed f o r  u se  on t h e  s h u t t l e .  
e, The water stream and t h e  s t i ck -on  r o c k e t  means of a r r e s t i n g  t h e  
tumbling of out-of-control  s p a c e c r a f t  should b e  s t u d i e d  f u r t h e r  and 
a de-tumbling system developed i n  t i m e  f o r  s h u t t l e  ope ra t ions .  
e The a b i l i t y  of crewmen t o  e v a l u a t e  senso ry  cues i n  a tumbling space- 
c r a f t  i n  space  shou ld  b e  i n v e s t i g a t e d  by s i m u l a t i o n  and o t h e r  tests. 
The o b j e c t i v e  would b e  t o  determine i f  u n t r a i n e d  pe r sonne l  can make 
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4.0 SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER EFFORT 
The fo l lowing  sugges t ions  are made f o r  f u r t h e r  s t u d y  e f f o r t :  
o The haza rds  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  s h u t t l e  o r b i t e r  payloads and t h e  
m e a s u r e s  r e q u i r e d  t o  c o n t r o l  them should be s t u d i e d  f o r  t h e  
prelaunch,  launch,  boost ,  d e o r b i t ,  r e e n t r y ,  l and ing ,  and pos t -  
l and ing  phases  of s h u t t l e  mis s ions ,  
9 The behavior  o f  f l u i d s  as they  are s p i l l e d  o r  r e l e a s e d  i n  a 
zero-g environment, b o t h  i n t o  vacuum and i n  p r e s s u r i z e d  
environments,  should be analyzed t h e o r e t i c a l l y  t o  o b t a i n  a 
comprehensive understanding of p h y s i c a l  and chemical phenomena, 
and t o  i d e n t i f y  p o t e n t i a l  hazards  and areas of unknown. 
e The dynamics of docking between v e h i c l e s  w i t h  docking axes o f f -  
set from t h e i r  c e n t e r s  o f  g r a v i t y  should be analyzed t o  d e t e r -  
mine p o s s i b l e  problem areas. 
g iven  t o  a t t i t u d e  c o n t r o l  f a i l u r e s  immediately b e f o r e  o r  a f t e r  
c o n t a c t ,  
P a r t i c u l a r  a t t e n t i o n  should be 
o A t  some a p p r o p r i a t e  t i m e  i n  t h e  s h u t t l e  program a s t u d y  should 
b e  i n i t i a t e d  t o  determine whether escape o r  s u r v i v a b i l i t y  
c a p a b i l i t y  w i l l  be r e q u i r e d .  The s tudy  should cons ide r  p o t e n t i a l  
t i m e  c r i t i ca l i t i e s  o€.emergencies f o r  t h e  s h u t t l e  and i t s  pay- 
l o a d s ;  a v a i l a b i l i t y  and t i m e  of s h u t t l e  r e scue ;  and d e s i g n  and 
c o s t  s t u d i e s  of t h e  recommended escape and s u r v i v a b i l i t y  concepts.  
0 The requirements  and c a p a b i l i t i e s  f o r  mis s ion  a b o r t ,  and f o r  crew 
and passenger  escape and r e s c u e  from the s h u t t l e  o r b i t e r  and 
manned payloads should be s t u d i e d  f o r  t h e  launch,  b o o s t ,  d e o r b i t ,  
* r e e n t r y ,  l a n d i n g ,  and post- landing phases.  The o b j e c t i v e  should 
be t o  i d e n t i f y  and recommend p r a c t i c a l  s o l u t i o n s  c o n s i s t e n t  w i th  
t h e  s h u t t l e  program. 
s o l u t i o n s  recommended f o r  t h e  on-orbi t  phases  of e scape  and 
r e s c u e ,  
Th i s  t a s k  should b e  i n t e g r a t e d  wi th  t h e  
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